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Abstract  
This article works towards developing a theoretical framework outlining the premises and 
parameters under which forensic experts operate during various stages of international criminal 
investigations and the presentation of expert witness testimony in court. With reference to law 
and science literature, the article explores the reasons for undertaking resource-intensive 
forensic investigations; secondly it outlines the ways in which evidence is gathered and 
interpreted, the process of constructing ‘forensic truth’; and finally it examines what happens to 
‘forensic truth’ once it enters the legal arena. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and its activities are used to illustrate the issues involved during the ‘forensic 
expertise meets international law’ interface. Specifically the forensic exhumations conducted 
around the Srebrenica events of July 1995 and their use in the Krstić trial serve to contextualise 
the debate. 
 
1. Introduction 
Between 10 and 19 July the so called United Nations (UN) ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica was 
captured by units of the Bosnian Serb Army. Many thousands of military-aged men were 
captured and killed as they tried to flee, whilst women, children and elderly people were 
uprooted and transported under terrifying conditions to Bosnian Muslim-held territory. 
During the Krstić trial forensic evidence from mass graves corroborated the testimonies 
of witnesses concerning the mass executions and burial of thousands of Bosnian Muslim 
men. The forensic evidence, which included reports on the exhumations, autopsies and 
laboratory analysis as well as photographic evidence, material artefacts and expert 
witness testimony, helped to establish the actus reus of the crimes and contributed to 
ascertaining the ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
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religious group, as such’1 (the mental element of genocide according to the Genocide 
Convention). In order to generate this type of information, the forensic expertise needed 
comprised various disciplines such as forensic anthropology, archaeology and pathology. 
Many scientists have shared their ICTY experiences of mass grave exhumations, 
post-mortem examinations and analysis;2 and legal experts have commented on rules of 
evidence and international criminal proceedings.3  Whilst the topic of scientific evidence 
in court has been explored in various national settings,4 this has yet to be related to an 
international legal framework. Similarly, an assessment of the complex relations between 
forensic experts involved during atrocity crime investigations, their conclusions, and the 
lawyers who interpret these at an international tribunal is still to come. This paper 
explores how the forensic experts’ gathering of facts and scientific interpretation of 
events, the construction of ‘forensic truth’, finds its way into trials where it is re-
interpreted by legal experts to achieve ‘procedural truth’5 expressed through the verdict. 
This exploration within the context of international justice is all the more important as 
                                                 
1 Article 4(2) ICTYSt and Article 2, UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1948).  
2 E.g. W.D. Haglund, ‘Recent Mass Graves: An Introduction’, in W.D. Haglund and M.H. Sorg (eds), 
Advances in Forensic Taphonomy: Method, Theory and Archaeological Perspectives (Boca Raton, 
London: CRC Press, 2002) 243-261 and S. Schmitt, ‘Mass Graves and the Collection of Forensic Evidence: 
Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity’, in W.D. Haglund and M.H. Sorg (eds), Advances in 
Forensic Taphonomy: Method, Theory and Archaeological Perspectives (Boca Raton, London: CRC Press, 
2002) 277-292. 
3 E.g. K.D. Rutledge, ‘”Spoiling Everything” - but for Whom? Rules of Evidence and International 
Criminal Proceedings’, 16 Regent University Law Review (2003) 151-189; R. May and M. Wierda, ‘Trends 
in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha’, 37 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law (1999) 752-766. 
4 Neil Browne and his colleagues concentrate on expert testimony in the US, England, Korea and France 
(N.M. Browne, C.L. Williamson, and L.L. Barkacs, ‘The Perspectival Nature of Expert Testimony in the 
United States, England, Korea and France’, 18 Connecticut Journal of International Law (2002) 55-102), 
whilst Sheila Jasanoff and Gary Edmond examine the use of science in US and Australian courts 
respectively (S. Jasanoff,  ‘Just Evidence: The Limits of Science in the Legal Process’, 34 Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics (2006) 328-341; G. Edmond, ‘Science, Law and Narrative’, 23 Southern Illinois 
University Law Journal (1999) 555-583). 
5 The term ‘procedural truth’ is taken from T. Weigend, ‘Is the Criminal Process About Truth? A German 
Perspective’, 29 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy (2003) 157-173. 
 2
some transitional justice scholars believe that one rationale for, and a function of, justice 
is to create an accurate historical record.6
For illustration, this article concentrates on the Srebrenica investigations7 and the 
presentation of forensic evidence during the Krstić case. Using trial transcripts and 
reviewing literature from across the disciplines generates an account of why forensic 
experts are invited to engage in international investigations, what their role during the 
investigations is and how their findings enter the legal arena. Through analysis of the 
relevant material, the potential and limitations of forensic evidence, which is by 
definition embedded within a legal context, and its use, will become evident. 
2. Why Seek Forensic Expertise? 
As Deputy Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS), Radislav Krstić was charged 
with genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war.8 To 
establish that killings on a mass scale which may qualify as genocide had actually 
occurred, the prosecution had to collect relevant evidence to prove the dolus specialis 
behind the deed, showing that the crimes were planned with the specific intention of 
destroying a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. Forensic 
experts could help gather and interpret admissible evidence to provide ‘unequivocal 
                                                 
6 Michael Scharf and Paul Williams, for example, believe that the creation of a historical record is one 
element of the justice process needed to create peaceful societies after war: ‘These include establishing 
individual responsibility and denying collective guilt, dismantling and discrediting institutions and leaders 
responsible for the commission of atrocities, establishing an accurate historical record, providing victim 
catharsis, and promoting deterrence’ (M. Scharf and P. Williams, ‘The Functions of Justice and Anti-
Justice in the Peace-Building Process’, 35 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2003) 161-
190, at 170). 
7 The investigations into the Srebrenica massacres from 1996 onwards are documented in Dean Manning’s 
summary report (D. Manning (ICTY Investigator), ‘Srebrenica Investigations. Summary of Forensic 
Evidence - Execution Points and Mass Graves’, ICTY, 16 May 2000, available at: 
http://www.domovina.net/archive/2000/20000516_manning.pdf (visited 25 January 2007)). 
8 Amended Indictment, Krstić (IT-98-33), 27 October 1999, §§ 21-33. 
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corroboration to what could otherwise be suspect or dubious evidence.’9 Consequently, 
forensic experts were invited to undertake forensic investigations and exhumations under 
the ICTY started on 7 July in 1996 at Cerska, near Srebrenica.10 The role of forensic 
experts included: 
 Examining and interpreting material to provide relevant, previously unknown 
information; 
 Collating results into a report for the prosecution, potentially for the defence 
and for presentation in court; 
 Presenting verbal evidence as expert witnesses during a trial.11 
 
As Krstić was accused, inter alia, of genocide, the information needed by the prosecution 
for his trial was the ‘categorical identification’ of dead bodies: i.e. establishing the 
ethnicity, religion, ancestry, cause and manner of death, as well as attempting to establish 
the link between Krstić and the crimes to show his personal intent. 
3. ‘How you come out in a case often depends on how you go in’12 – Construction of 
‘Forensic Truth’  
The contexts in which lawyers and forensic experts interact during criminal 
investigations can be divided into three main areas: pre-forensic investigation, forensic 
                                                 
9 G.T. Blewitt, ‘The Role of Forensic Investigations in Genocide Prosecutions before an International 
Criminal Tribunal’, 37 Medicine, Science and the Law (1997) 284-288, at 284. 
10 Third Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 
1991. UN doc. A/51/292-S/1996/665, 16 August 1996, § 79. 
11 See P. Cobb, ‘Forensic Science’, in P. White (ed), Crime Scene to Court. The Essentials of Forensic 
Science (Cambridge: The Royal Society of Chemistry, 1998) 1-14, at 9. 
12 R.J. Aldisert, ‘Logic in Forensic Science’, in C.H. Wechts and J.T. Rago (eds), Forensic Science and 
Law: Investigative Applications in Criminal, Civil, and Family Justice (Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis, 
2006) 11-34, at 28. 
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investigation and the expert witness testimony during the trial. In each of these situations, 
the roles, process and assumptions influencing the collection, interpretation and 
presentation of forensic evidence will be discussed. 
 
A. Pre-investigation 
Once the decision to seek forensic expertise has been taken, the investigation team must 
establish where to find crime scenes and graves, before planning the excavation and 
exhumation processes. This is not necessarily a straightforward undertaking: 
Merely locating a crime scene can be a formidable task. The majority of 
the crimes committed during the break-up of the former Yugoslavia were 
totally unreported. A few did attain almost instant world-wide publicity. In 
general, however, unspeakable atrocities took place in isolated locations, 
under cover of darkness, in non-descript buildings, in common fields and 
forests, out of sight of media cameras or military surveillance, totally 
unknown to the wider world.13
  
In August 1995, US Ambassador Madeleine Albright informed the UN Security 
Council of the existence of classified aerial photographs regarding Srebrenica.14 
Subsequently the ICTY prosecution team, with help from a forensic expert, was able to 
examine the aerial images dating from 7 July and 27 July 1995. Along with eye witness 
testimony of survivors, disturbed soil and anomalies in geological features on the 
photographs led the investigation team to suspect the existence of mass graves at various 
sites (e.g. Cerska, Nova Kasaba).15 Through a forensic site assessment the graves were 
then located, confirmed and defined to facilitate meticulous planning of the exhumations. 
                                                 
13 M.B. Harmon and F. Gaynor, ‘Prosecuting Massive Crimes with Primitive Tools: Three Difficulties 
Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal Proceedings’, 2 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2004) 403-409, at 405. 
14 See Manning, supra note 7, at 12. 
15 Ibid., at 9-12. 
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Furthermore, forensic experts assisted in establishing the scope of the forensic enquiry by 
giving an indication as to which site would yield what type evidence.   
B. Forensic Investigation 
Operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the OTP’s forensic teams comprised 
forensic experts, investigators and support personnel and included dozens of people. The 
key positions were those of the investigator, the chief archaeologist, the chief 
anthropologist and the chief pathologist; the last three headed the forensic teams at the 
grave site or mortuary and led the forensic examination. 
ICTY investigator Dean Manning summarised an investigator’s duties regarding 
exhumations and autopsies as including: 
… attendance at exhumation sites, on site briefings relating to the crime 
scenes, the examination and assessment of evidence in situ and the 
comparison of evidence obtained from various exhumation sites and 
autopsies, the hand over of bodies to authorities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and the examination, assessment and transport to the ICTY 
offices in The Hague of evidence obtained during the exhumation and 
autopsy process.16
 
Forensic archaeologists apply their survey and excavation skills to the site; they 
are experienced in identifying, excavating and recording complex features, and 
recovering human remains and artefacts. They are also experts in recognising taphonomic 
alteration to soils, human remains and other materials recovered which helps elucidate 
what happened to the victims at the point of death and thereafter.17 During the Srebrenica 
                                                 
16 Witness Statement by Investigations Team Leader Dean Paul Manning, Milošević (IT-02-54-T), 24 
November 2003, § 4, available at: http://www.domovina.net/archive/2003/20031124_manning.pdf (visited 
25 January 2007) (hereinafter Milošević Witness Statement by Investigations Team Leader Dean Paul 
Manning). 
17 M. Skinner and J. Sterenberg, ‘Turf Wars: Authority and Responsibility for the Investigation of Mass 
Graves’, 151 Forensic Science International (2005) 221-232, at 224. 
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investigations, primary as well as secondary graves were located: a sign of the 
archaeologists’ ability to link execution with inhumation sites, and primary inhumation 
sites with secondary ones. 
The forensic pathologists’ main role is to perform the post-mortem examination 
of bodies and human remains to establish the cause of death and identity of the victims. 
Criminal aspects of death tend to leave physical traces and the pathologist has experience 
in recognising torture and/or starvation prior to death, trauma, entrance and exit wounds 
from firearms etc.18 He or she works closely with the anthropologists, odontologists and 
radiographers.  
Forensic anthropologists are specialists in analysing skeletal and dental remains as 
well as taphonomic alterations. Critically, they are able to distinguish between bones’ 
state during an individual’s lifetime, at the time of death and after death and can thus 
contribute towards establishing ancestry, sex, age at death, stature, handedness etc. They 
reconstruct fragmented and disarticulated skeletons to facilitate the calculation of the 
minimum number of individuals (MNI) and to aid the identification process.19  
Everything that is undertaken at the site or within the mortuary is thoroughly 
recorded in the most appropriate media such as log books, autopsy reports, photographs, 
X-rays and field notes. 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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1. Limits at the Site  
Between 1996 and the end of 1999, 17 mass graves had been exhumed relating to the 
Srebrenica massacres, and a further 23 sites examined.20 The sites were selected 
according to the prosecution’s strategy and the boundaries of the sites, in which the 
forensic experts were to work, established. As Skinner and Sterenberg observe, however, 
a crime has no natural boundaries.21 Through the limits set in space and in time, the scene 
is not the same as in the past and the representation of the actual burial scene (not to 
mention the crime scene) is partial.22 Although the forensic experts’ working 
environment has been determined, it is defined not only by the presence of data and 
information but also through the absence of potential evidence23 and shows the limits of 
scientific and objective information obtainable from such a site before the collection even 
starts.  
2. Operational and Institutional Constraints 
The security levels at the site and during personnel transportation are critical to facilitate 
successful investigations.24 Support structures such as equipment, facilities and health 
and safety considerations – not always a given in war-torn countries – impact on 
procedures and results. Inadequate equipment will compromise the quantity and quality 
                                                 
20 Manning, supra note 7, at 4. 
21 Skinner and Sterenberg, supra note 17, at 227. 
22 For a more comprehensive description of scenes connected to crimes and the task of defining these, see 
Skinner and Sterenberg, ibid.  
23 Lorin de la Grandmaison and his colleagues in their study into ethical considerations of forensic 
pathologists note that some pathologists were well aware that various mass-graves were not investigated, 
fueling speculations of bias and misrepresentation of facts (G. Lorin de la Grandmaison, M. Durigon, G. 
Moutel and C. Herve ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
Forensic Pathologist: Ethical Considerations’, 48 Medicine, Science and the Law (2006) 208-212). 
24 Forensic scientists Skinner, Alempijevic and Djuric-Srejic account that in their experience ‘[t]he most 
dangerous activity, by far, is driving to and from the site’ (M. Skinner, D. Alempijevic, and M. Djuric-
Srejic, ‘Guidelines for International Forensic Bio-Archaeology Monitors of Mass Grave Exhumations’, 134 
Forensic Science International (2003) 81-92, at 85). 
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of the evidence collected and these limitations must be spelt out in court.25 Appropriate 
Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) can also shelter forensic scientists from smells, 
sights, emotions and provide confidence in the overall value and integrity of the work 
conducted.26 In addition, the presence of other professional personnel is vital for the 
success of a mission, its coordination, documentation, administration and maintaining the 
chain of custody. 
Forensic work is automatically embedded into time and budget constraints. Given 
the principle ‘justice delayed is justice denied,’ time is critical for the prosecution team.27 
According to Browne et al., this explicitly value-driven legal approach ‘contrasts sharply 
with the purported intellectual openness of the scientific process and its quest for more 
reflective understandings, under few to no time constraints.’28 Consequently, forensic 
scientists, despite striving for independence and neutrality, need to complete exhumations 
and autopsies within a limited time-frame.29  
The objectives of an exhumation are clear from the outset; for the Srebrenica 
investigations, as stated by investigator Dean Manning, the basic objectives were:  
 to corroborate victim and witness accounts of the massacres; 
 to determine an accurate count of victims; 
 to determine cause of death and time of death; 
 to determine the identity of the victims and any link to the missing from 
Srebrenica; 
                                                 
25 J. Clark, ‘Pathological Investigation’, in J. Payne-James (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Forensic and Legal 
Medicine (London: Elsevier, 2005) 363-371, at 367. 
26 E.D. Williams and J.D. Crews, ‘From Dust to Dust: Ethical and Practical Issues Involved in the Location, 
Exhumation, and Identification of Bodies from Mass Graves’, 44, no.3 Croatian Medical Journal (2003) 
251-258, at 253. 
27 The accused has the right to a trial ‘without undue delay’ (Art. 21(4) ICTYSt). 
28 N.M. Browne, T.J. Keeley, and W.J. Hiers, ‘The Epistemological Role of Expert Witnesses and Toxic 
Torts’, 36 American Business Law Journal (1998) 1-72, at 39. 
29 Stover and Shigekane report that during the Kosovo investigations the agenda was to investigate as much 
and as quickly as possible (E. Stover and R. Shigekane, ‘Exhumation of Mass Graves: Balancing Legal and 
Humanitarian Needs’, in E. Stover and H.M. Weinstein (eds), My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and 
Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 85-103).
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 to determine the gender [sic] of the victims; 
 to identify any links between primary mass graves and secondary mass grave 
sites;  
 to identify links to the perpetrators.30 
 
The on site briefings by the investigator should contain factual and background 
information ‘avoiding speculative scenarios which could bias the expert to try to prove 
the prosecutor's theory of a case.’31 Amongst forensic experts this triggers the debate 
about how many or how few facts to provide and views may differ between individuals 
and the various forensic disciplines.32 If it is assumed that facts are neutral pieces of 
information, value-free data, then can facts ever stop being neutrally informative and start 
corrupting an investigation? Even if science is free of irrational prejudice, can the experts 
remain prejudice-free when given a brief or when the investigators seek subtly to 
influence the investigation? A scientist’s everyday life is about establishing and 
disproving hypotheses. Providing a forensic expert with a prosecution theory, so defence 
lawyers argue, will guide forensic activities in a certain direction, thus, influencing the 
investigation to the detriment of the neutral and objective overall view. When asked 
during cross-examination whether forensic pathologists are expected to prove the theory 
of the prosecution, pathologist Dr Christopher Lawrence replied:  
                                                 
30 Milošević Witness Statement by Investigations Team Leader Dean Paul Manning, supra note 16, § 9. 
31 Skinner and Sterenberg, supra note 17, at 223. 
32 Recently during the Popović et al. trial the defender asked Chief Pathologist Dr John Clark during cross-
examination about the briefing received by ICTY investigators before the Srebrenica autopsies. Dr Clark 
replied that they had received ‘remarkably little information’ which, in his view, was positive. He went on 
to explain his point: ‘There is an argument whether we should … do a case sort of blind or with some 
information. I think there is a happy medium. I think we probably reached this here, and certainly we had 
little detailed information about the cases. Other than to the extent that we were generally informed whether 
this was a primary grave of whether this was a grave which had been disturbed, and that explained why so 
many of the bodies were disrupted. … but in terms of what weapons had been used, … we were the main 
instigators of that information from our findings.’ (Trial Transcript, Popović et al. (IT-05-88-T), Trial 
Chamber, 19 February 2007, 7348-7349 (hereinafter Popović et al. Trial Transcript)). 
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No. My job as a forensic pathologist in this, along with everything else I 
do, is to test the information that I have been given to see if it is true. In 
the course of any investigation that I do, I am given information but it is 
my job to test that information to see if it is correct.33
     
Testing, in the context of atrocity crime investigations, means to examine the body for 
clothing, personal possessions, identifying features, taphonomic characteristics, 
blindfolds, ligatures, gunshot injuries, blast injuries, sharp and blunt-force trauma, 
burning, dismemberment etc.34 Similarly, archaeologists and anthropologists at the site 
employ methods, such as surveying, trenching and excavating, to gather information 
before analysing it.  
Forensic science faces a paradox with regard to the best level of briefing: whilst 
more background information implies a greater involvement with the prosecution’s 
strategies, it can underpin the quality of research by raising the experts’ awareness of 
details and potential evidence.35  Some argue that it is simplistic to believe that forensic 
experts remain impartial when given little information:  
First, there may be no simple or uncontroversial way of separating 
‘scientific’ facts from their ‘background’ context. And secondly, the 
umbrella term ‘forensic science’ embraces a set of intensely practical 
disciplines to which the paradigm of pure scientific enquiry cannot readily 
be applied.36
Indeed, it must be noted that forensic work at exhumation or mortuary sites is not a ‘pure’ 
science in the sense that hypotheses can be experimentally tested. 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 21 February 2007, 7519. 
34 Clark, supra note 25, at 368. 
35 The Role of Forensic Science Evidence in Criminal Proceedings report suggests a solution to the 
dilemma: ‘Insofar as the provision of extra background information may pose a threat to the independence 
of the forensic scientist, this may need to be offset by strengthened procedures to ensure that their work is 
scrutinized by qualified and experienced defence experts’ (The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 
‘The Role of Forensic Science Evidence in Criminal Proceedings’, Research Study 11 (London: HMSO, 
1993), 36). 
36 Ibid., at 30. 
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3. Science and Forensic Science 
Science is a ‘valued means of getting to know the world.’37 Scientific activity directed to 
this goal is based on the scientific ethos of ‘universalism, organized scepticism, 
communality, ethical neutrality, and disinterestedness’38 and adherence to the code 
should make science value-free. However, science and the way in which the scientific 
community operates cannot exclude arbitrary elements in their quest for knowledge.39 
Furthermore, science cannot claim that its pronouncements are certain, they are merely 
the most probable given the present evidence, and the practice of science cannot be 
separated from the social sphere. The view that ‘scientists are not disintegrated agents but 
rather are immersed in a web of relations that play an important role in determining the 
character of truths that emerge from their interaction’40 gained considerable ground. With 
experts trying to conform to and operate within scientifically accepted, but socially 
constructed, knowledge, the outcome of scientific analysis is predestined to fit this 
particular set of thoughts.  
That science does not operate outside the social dimension is particularly true of 
forensic science, whose root in the Latin word forensis (meaning publicly, belonging to 
the market, to the court41) implies the legal and social aspects.  Forensic science is 
embedded in the social process of legal inquiry and the social sphere is the reason for its 
                                                 
37 B. Russell, The Impact of Science on Society (London: Unwin Books, 1968), 73. 
38 R.A. Rothman, ‘A Dissenting View on the Scientific Ethos’, 23 The British Journal of Sociology (1972) 
102-108, at 102. Rothman expands on the four norms of science (universalism, communism, 
disinterestedness, and organised scepticism) proposed by Robert K. Merton.
39 Browne et al., supra note 28, at 50.  
40 Ibid. Lorin de la Grandmaison and his colleagues claim that most pathologists involved in the ICTY 
investigations came from NATO member states. It was NATO, however, who dropped bombs against the 
Serbian army in Kosovo in 1999. The article suggests that the country of origin, its foreign policy and 
media reports may have an effect on those involved in investigation, thus introducing conscious or 
unconscious bias (de La Grandmaison et al., supra note 23).
41 R. Hau and E. Kulf, Pons Globalwörterbuch Lateinisch-Deutsch (Köln: Klett, 1991). 
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existence: to reconstruct events that happened in the past. This is not to reject the 
scientific knowledge or truth it produces per se. It does, however, raise the question of 
how this knowledge is produced to then be interpreted in court.  
The term ‘forensic science’ is problematic for an understanding of what it 
produces and what methods are adopted throughout the process of forensic investigations. 
Forensic science suggests a unity which does not exist: Under the homogenous term lie 
many heterogeneous disciplines (archaeology, anthropology, pathology, radiography, 
molecular biology etc.) with the potential to produce different pieces of information. In 
fact, the disciplines with which this paper is concerned, strictly speaking, do not qualify 
as ‘pure’ science but rather as ‘applied science’ or ‘medical science’.42 Archaeology and 
anthropology, for example, are concerned with recording and collecting human and 
material remains. They follow protocols and employ distinct methods for both the data-
gathering and data-analysis phases.43 These methods are designed to help the experts 
make decisions regarding their findings, but the methods themselves can operate with 
ordinal categories, as opposed to defined measurable intervals, making the process 
subjective and qualitative in nature. ‘One of the most common problems faced by 
forensic anthropologists’, writes Byers in his forensic anthropology textbook, ‘is how to 
make a single determination from ambiguous data.’44 Although techniques employed 
during anthropological and archaeological investigations must be consistent with 
‘established scientific principles, validated and, preferably, published so they can be 
                                                 
42 S. Byers, Introduction to Forensic Anthropology, (3rd edn, Boston: Pearson, 2008), 1. 
43 Anthropologists use anthroposcopic, osteometric, chemical and histologic methods for data generations 
and range charts, indexes, discriminant functions and regression equations for concise analysis (Ibid., at 
16). 
44 Ibid. 
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scrutinized by the scientific community at large’,45 the decisions made are more often 
concerned with probabilities rather than certainties. Consequently, forensic evidence is 
formed though both scientific and non-scientific factors. Given that many of the findings 
are subject to dispute, protocols ensuring consistency and reliability in the order and 
application of techniques become paramount. Forensic science, especially in the context 
of exhumation and autopsy, relies on adherence to procedures and professional 
experience as a quality control, because the evidence can only be collected once – there is 
no room for experiments. This is why recording each step during the process is so 
important before the material is analysed.  
 
4. Report  
Findings from the exhumation site and mortuary are summarised in individual reports 
prepared by the chief anthropologist, chief archaeologist and chief pathologist and by 
those responsible for other site-unrelated scientific investigations.46 They contain 
information on the minimum number of individuals located in the exhumed graves, sex of 
the deceased, cause of death as well as presence of blindfolds and ligatures.47  The 
scientists weigh the data and decide whether to include limitations of analysis or exclude 
certain facts from their reports – they are selective. In this sense, the report, as the process 
of documenting and interpreting the evidence, is an act of selected knowledge creation 
                                                 
45 Cobb, supra note 11, at 9. 
46 For the Srebrenica investigations, six additional scientific examinations of recovered material were 
conducted, analysing mineralogical and pollen samples, self-winding watches (located in the mass graves) 
blood and tissue samples, suspected explosive residue, shell cases as well as cloth blindfolds and ligatures 
(see Manning, supra note 7, at 12-15). 
47 Ibid. 
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and contains, for the purpose of this article, ‘forensic truth’. ‘Forensic truth’ can thus be 
defined as the constructed theory of what is likely to be true given the circumstances. 
The report makes this ‘forensic truth’ accessible to others and needs to be 
intelligible, clear and unambiguous whilst explaining all the important scientific 
findings.48 These reports are reviewed by the investigator and forwarded to The Hague.49 
Whilst the investigator empowers and limits the forensic scientists in their pursuit of 
evidence, the report, created for a cause beyond the forensic scientists’ control, empowers 
and limits the prosecution’s claims in court.  Forensic science, despite its limits, aspires 
to objective and independent truth, whereas in the legal arena it is used by the parties to 
persuade the judges to believe a particular version of the truth. 
 
4. ‘Forensic Truth’ in Court 
Legal systems, in their administration of justice, rely on the assistance of scientists50 and 
the ICTY is no exception. Experts are consulted to aid in the process of establishing a 
factual account of events. However, forensic evidence is admitted not because of its 
truthfulness per se, but because it is relevant to a case. Hence it is important to realise 
‘that science enters the courtroom not in the form of bare facts or claimed truths about the 
world, but as evidence.’51 Rule 95 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence52 
regulates the admissibility of evidence: 
                                                 
48 Skinner et al. provide a description of what a report should contain (Skinner et al., supra note 24, at 91-
92).
49 Although reports may be tendered as evidence in a case, the authors of the reports are not necessarily 
asked to become expert witnesses during the trial. 
50 M. Freeman, ‘Law and Science: Science and Law’, in M. Freeman and H. Reece (eds), Science in Court 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998) 1-9. 
51 Jasanoff, supra note 4, at 329. 
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No evidence shall be admissible if obtained by methods which cast 
substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and 
would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceeding.53  
 
With no mention of the scientific standards to be adhered to, this exclusionary rule is in 
stark contrast to the Daubert Guidelines which determine whether expert evidence is 
scientific and therefore admissible under Federal Rule 70254 in US courts, as summarised 
by Christensen: 
1. The content of the testimony can be (and has been) tested using the 
scientific method. 
2. The technique has been subject to peer review, preferably in the form of 
publication in peer reviewed literature. 
3. There are consistently and reliably applied professional standards and 
known or potential error rates for the technique. 
4. Consider general acceptance within the relevant scientific community.55  
 
Nevertheless, during examination and cross-examination some of the criteria outlined by 
the Daubert Guidelines were tested during the Krstić trial. 
A. ‘Forensic Truth’ as Part of the Legal Narrative 
‘Despite the maze of legal jargon, lawyers’ mysterious tactics, and obscure court 
procedures, any criminal case can be reduced to the simple form of a story.’56 During the 
Kristić trial, forensic evidence became part of a narrative with over 12 days dedicated to 
examining forensic exhibits and hearing expert witnesses regarding the examination of 
                                                                                                                                                 
52 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence were drafted by the ICTY judges and have been amended 
according to the experiences gained by the Tribunal throughout its existence (May and Wierda, supra note 
3). One of the primary purposes of the rules of procedures is to protect ‘the rights of the accused for the 
duration of the entire proceedings, pre-trial to sentencing .… Con-sequently, all of the rules can be 
understood at some level in terms of the accused’s rights’ (Rutledge supra note 3, at 181).
53 Rule 21(4) ICTY RPE. 
54 For an explanation of the Daubert guidelines and its predecessor, the Frye test, see Byers, supra note 42; 
Browne et al., supra note 4; Browne et al., supra note 28 and A.M. Christensen, ‘The Impact of Daubert: 
Implications for Testimony’, 49, no.3 Journal of Forensic Science (2004) 1-4. 
55 Ibid., at 2. 
56 W.L. Bennett and M.S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1981), 4. 
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execution points, primary and secondary graves.  Eight expert witnesses were called by 
the Prosecution to give evidence about the forensic findings.57 Expert witnesses are first 
examined by the prosecution, then by the defence and lastly by the judges. The 
examination of expert witnesses is based on the report they wrote and complemented by 
forensic exhibits. 
During the trial, the expert witness is a ‘servant to the court.’58 After the solemn 
declaration, the witness ‘is a witness of truth before the Tribunal and, inasmuch as he or 
she is required to contribute to the establishment of truth, not strictly a witness for either 
party.’59 The role of an expert witness is to provide impartial and neutral evidence to 
enhance the tribunal’s understanding of events. Whilst Cobb insists that ‘[t]he scientist 
can only give evidence on work carried out personally or under direct supervision’, he 
can comment on and ‘interpret factual evidence given by another witness under oath in 
the light of scientific findings and knowledge.’60 He specifically emphasises that the 
forensic scientist is personally responsible for his or her results and analysis, not 
corporately accountable. Nevertheless, at the ICTY experts testified on behalf of their 
forensic team because of the vast number of forensic experts employed during the 
process and the rotational aspect of deployment.61
                                                 
57 Two experts were forensic anthropologists (Jose-Pablo Baraybar and Dr William Haglund), two forensic 
pathologists (Dr John Clark and Dr Christopher Lawrence), one forensic archaeologist (Prof. Richard 
Wright), one demographer (Dr Helge Brunborg) and two ICTY investigators (Dean Manning and Jean-
Rene Ruez). 
58 T. Rothwell, ‘Presentation of Expert Forensic Evidence’, in P. White (ed), Crime Scene to Court: The 
Essentials of Forensic Science (Cambridge: The Royal Society of Chemistry, 1998) 327-351, at 349. 
59 Decision on Communication between the Parties and their Witnesses, Kupreškić et al. (IT-95-16-T), 
Trial Chamber, 21 September 1998. 
60 Cobb, supra note 11, at 9. 
61 Many team members could only be present for a few weeks at a time depending on their employers’ 
capacity to release them. This was particularly the case for professionals such as police officers, 
pathologists, odontologists and radiographers (Margaret Cox, Personal Communication, 5 July 2007). 
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How does the prosecution create a plausible narrative through the use of forensic 
evidence? Although forensic evidence in its construction may be limited, ‘when executed 
correctly, the results are viewed as no longer bearing traces of human subjectivity.’62 For 
this reason, the prosecution aims to present the expert and the findings as being as 
convincing and reliable as possible. At the ICTY, there are, however, no clear-cut criteria 
to determine the expert status of a witness.63 In Krstić, therefore, prosecution lawyer 
Peter McCloskey asked archaeologist and expert witness Professor Richard Wright to 
outline his educational and professional background, his experience and that of his team 
members in order to establish the expert as a credible source of information before 
questioning him about his methods, findings and interpretations. 64 Although it was not 
mentioned explicitly during the Krstić trial, emphasising adherence to protocols can help 
argue for a small error margin and create the image of ‘proper’ science. During the 
exhumations protocols were in place, however, because conditions at a site differ from 
grave to grave, they were relatively flexible to allow experts to adapt to each situation. 
The protocols used under Professor Wright comprised a two page document with 
procedures regarding individual team member responsibilities, surveying of the site and 
its surroundings, assignment of numbers to artefacts, bodies and body parts, keeping logs, 
photographing in situ, transfer of the items of evidence from the site, packaging and 
storage, and logs as to who attended the site.65 The procedures were complemented by a 
                                                 
62 Jasanoff, supra note 4, at 330. 
63 Rutledge, supra note 3, at 177. 
64 Trial Transcript, Krstić (IT-98-33-T), Trial Chamber, 28 May 2000, 3633-3642 (hereinafter Krstić Trial 
Transcript).  
65 R. Wright, ‘General Procedures for ICTY Exhumations at *****[site name].’ (unpublished document, 
2000). Having an inflexible protocol can indeed be disadvantageous for the prosecution as deviation from 
the protocol may demand justification and damage witness and evidence credibility. However, this can be 
offset by processes regulating deviations from the norm, explaining why changes have been made, but in 
turn that introduces more paperwork and might be impractical. 
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Checklist for Location, Attitudes and Properties of a Skeletonised Body, where the 
forensic archaeologist or anthropologist could indicate the properties of the bodies 
found.66  
The forensic evidence tendered by the prosecution regarding the Srebrenica 
investigations revealed that between 1996 and the end of 1999, the minimum number of 
individuals located in the exhumed graves was 1883. A further 2571 individuals at least 
were believed to be buried in examined but un-exhumed sites. Of the individuals 
recovered, 1656 were positively determined to be male, one was female, whilst the sex of 
220 remained undetermined. During exhumation and autopsy, 270 blindfolds and 407 
ligatures were found. Autopsies confirmed that hundreds had died of gunshot wounds. 
For each of the exhumation sites, the sex, age and cause of death of the individuals 
recovered was listed, as well as ligatures, blindfolds, shell cases, bullets, identification 
artefacts and religious artefacts.67
B. Legal Deconstruction 
Given that forensic evidence is constructed, Jasanoff claims that what is presented 
as fact or truth needs to be ‘legally deconstructed’.68  There is no better tool than cross-
examination to unravel knowledge claims. Cross-examination, an adversarial element 
within the ICTY structure, aims ‘to elicit information favourable to the party on whose 
                                                 
66 R. Wright, ‘Checklist for Location, Attitudes and Properties of a Skeletonised Body. (unpublished 
document, 2000). 
67 Manning, supra note 7. 
68 S. Jasanoff, ‘What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science’, 32 (Spring) Jurimetrics (1992) 
345-359, at 348. 
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behalf it is conducted and to cast doubt on the accuracy of evidence given against that 
party’69 or indeed to discredit the witness.  
Law and science literature refers to the term ‘boundary-work’ - an attempt to 
create a strong image of science by contrasting it favourably to other, non-scientific 
intellectual activities70 - as one means of shielding scientific work from challenges. 
During a trial, prosecution and defence parties operate with the boundary-work notions of 
expansion, monopolisation, protection and expulsion to establish expert credibility or 
indeed to discredit opposing experts.71 The parties aim to suggest that their expert’s 
authority and expertise extends into other domains and professions (expansion), or that 
the expertise of their witness is the most appropriate to be called in relation to the case at 
hand (monopolisation) or to protect them from outside criticism (protection), or indeed to 
exclude those who do not belong to the profession, labelling them as ‘non-members’ 
(expulsion). All this is done in an attempt to either affirm or discredit the credibility of a 
witness, the credibility of findings or the credibility of methods and protocols to make a 
narrative more plausible. 
The cross-examination during the Krstić trial sought to establish that some of the 
deceased had died in combat. The anthropologist could not deny that possibility,72 nor 
could the pathologist disagree with the defence that some injuries may have happened 
post-mortem.73 However, the defence’s cross-examination hardly attempted to discredit 
                                                 
69 E.A. Martin and J. Law (eds), Oxford Dictionary of Law (6th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 142. 
70 T.F. Gieryn, ‘Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests 
in Professional Ideologies of Scientists’, 48, no.6 American Sociological Review (1983) 781-795. 
71 Edmond, supra note 4, at 384. 
72 See Anthropologist Jose Pablo Baraybar’s testimony (Krstić Trial Transcript, supra note 64, 30 May 
2000, 3859). 
73 See Dr Clark’s cross-examination (Ibid., 31 May 2000, 3957).  
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the forensic evidence provided.74 Even defence expert Dr Zoran Stankovic, although 
challenging some of the forensic investigations into cause of death, claiming that some 
had been killed in combat, ‘accepted that the exhumations were conducted by experts 
with “substantial professional experience and adequate technical, scientific and moral 
integrity”.’75  
 
C. ‘Procedural Truth’ 
The ICTY adopts a mixture of adversarial and inquisitorial elements to administer justice. 
Whilst the adversarial model relies on ‘zealous advocacy’, it still strives to ‘seek a 
“truth”; one that is fair and just; not necessarily an objective or descriptive truth.’76 The 
inquisitorial approach, on the other hand, aims for an  
… approximation to the historical facts, and the process is geared toward 
finding these facts to the extent necessary for a credible judgment, 
regardless of the wishes of individual participants.77
 
The rationale for a mixed system is the belief that the closest grasp of the truth can be 
achieved through a neutral investigation with adversarial presentational elements – hence 
the cross-examination of witnesses. Judges are likely to hear more than one expert and 
are subjected to the experts’ multiple perspectives in order to establish some form of truth 
on which to base justice. Indeed, this poses an epistemological problem: how to establish 
what is legitimate or illegitimate knowledge? In order to answer this question, judges 
                                                 
74 This is not the case for the Popović et al. trial, where forensic scientist had to defend their standards and 
methods more vigorously. See for example cross-examination of anthropologist Dr William Haglund 
(Popović et al. Trial Transcript, supra note 32 15 March 2007, 8930-9008). 
75 Judgment, Krstić (IT-98-33-T), Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, § 76 (hereinafter Krstić Judgment). 
76 Browne et al., supra note 28, at 39. 
77 Weigend, supra note 5, at 171. 
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need to have an idea as to how the ‘forensic truth’ has been created before deciding how 
to weigh its relevance and credibility.  
Given the difficulty of establishing what is and what is not ‘forensic truth’, 
Browne argues for a  
… dynamic conception of epistemology that retains the idea that there can 
be epistemic legitimacy while at the same time emphasizing its contested 
nature and the process whereby conflicts concerning it emerge and are 
settled through exclusion, appropriation, or some other means.78  
 
Applying the criteria of consistency, appropriation and convincingness, whilst being 
aware of the social and traditional influences on judgments, is what the judges are left 
with. In the criminal justice context, legal scholars like Weigend thus prefer to speak of 
legal truth or ‘procedural truth, a function of what the process is to achieve’.79 
‘Procedural truth’, in the words of Naqvi, would suggest ‘agreement about factual reality 
but also space for differing interpretations.’80
What did the judges make of the ‘forensic truth’ presented to them during the 
Krstić trial? The fact that it was admitted does not indicate how much weight was 
attributed to its claims. Did the judges accept it as facts to base their verdict on? They 
first had to establish whether the crime of genocide had been committed before deciding 
whether Radislav Krstić was guilty of it. The Trial Chamber found that the forensic 
evidence corroborated ‘important aspects of the testimony of survivors from the 
execution sites’81 and was sufficiently credible and compelling to confirm the actus reus 
of genocide. The judges concluded that ‘following the take-over of Srebrenica, thousands 
                                                 
78 Browne et al., supra note 28, at 51. 
79 Weigend, supra note 5, at 170. 
80 Y. Naqvi, ‘The Right to the Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?’, 88 International Review of the 
Red Cross (2006) 245-273, at 272. 
81 Krstić Judgment, supra note 75, § 71. 
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of Bosnian Muslims were summarily executed and consigned to mass graves’.82 
Furthermore, the Trial Chamber found that forensic evidence suggesting that the majority 
of bodies exhumed had not been killed in combat was conclusive and decided that most 
of the over 7,000 missing people had been executed and buried in mass graves.83 The 
disappearance of generations of men, reasoned the Trial Chamber, showed the intent to 
physically destroy Bosnian Muslims. Forensic evidence provided further indication of the 
intent to destroy the group, as such, due to the findings that executions had followed a 
‘well-established pattern’84 and that bodies were not only concealed in mass graves, but 
were later dug up in an attempt to hide the crimes. The seven exhumed secondary graves 
contained commingled and mutilated body parts rendering identification as well as 
appropriate burials extremely difficult, thus causing further distress to the survivors.  
The Trial Chamber, once satisfied that genocide had occurred, then examined 
whether Krstić had shared the intention to carry out genocide. The fact that all located 
and examined gravesites associated with the Srebrenica incident were within the Drina 
Corps area of responsibility contributed to the Trial Chamber’s overall notion that Krstić 
was aware of the genocide: ‘due to their massive nature and the level of co-operation 
required, the executions [and the re-burials] could not have been accomplished in 
isolation from the Drina Corps Command.’85 Furthermore, despite the absence of 
forensic evidence to suggest that General Krstić had been present at any of the 
executions, the Trial Chamber was satisfied that he had participated in the joint criminal 
                                                 
82 Ibid., § 73. 
83 Ibid., § 82. 
84 Ibid., § 68. 
85 Ibid., § 276. 
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enterprise and shared the genocidal intent to kill the Bosnian Muslims. Consequently, on 
2nd August 2001, Radislav Krstić was found guilty of genocide.  
On appeal, however, this verdict was overturned. The Appeals Chamber 
concurred with the Trial Chamber that the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica did qualify as 
a protected group under Article 4 of the ICTY Statute. Furthermore, the Appeals 
Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber that ‘some members of the VRS Main staff 
intended to destroy Bosnian Muslims’,86 targeting for extinction the 40,000 Bosnian 
Muslims living in Srebrenica. But according to the Appeals Chamber, the cardinal 
question as to whether Krstić had had the necessary intent to commit genocide was not 
proven; it criticised the Trial Chamber for its ‘failure to supply adequate proof that 
Radislav Krstić possessed genocidal intent,’ ruling that Krstić ‘is not guilty of genocide 
as a principal perpetrator.’87 Instead the Appeals Chamber limited his liability in the joint 
criminal enterprise and  
… found Radislav Krstić responsible as an aider and abettor to genocide 
and to murders as a violation of the law or customs of war committed 
between 13 and 19 July 1995, instead of as a co-perpetrator, as found by 
the Trial Chamber.88  
 
In order to give judgment, the judges had to rule on the base crime, the context, 
before contemplating the guilt of the accused. In this sense, ‘forensic truth’ had a part to 
play, convincing them of the factuality of the forensic accounts. Forensic evidence from 
the mass graves helped to define the targeted group as Bosnian Muslims; it contributed to 
the ruling that the intent to commit genocide existed, through demonstrating the 
                                                 
86 Judgement, Krstić (IT-98-33-A), Appeals Chamber, 19 April 2004, § 26. 
87 Ibid., § 134. 
88 Ibid., § 266. 
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systematic nature of the killings; it showed that many of the dead were civilians and that 
attempts had been made to conceal the crimes. Furthermore, through the location and 
excavation of the mass graves, forensic science assisted in outlining the amount of 
cooperation required to undertake such executions and burials, thus indirectly suggesting 
the involvement or knowledge of the Drina Corps which ultimately led to implicating its 
commander, General Krstić. However, forensic evidence did not establish a direct link 
between Krstić and the killings. 
The Krstić ruling and its use of forensic evidence has since been relevant to other 
Srebrenica cases, especially Blagojević, Popović et al, and the Milošević case, as he was 
charged inter alia with genocide and complicity in genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Similarly, in the 2007 Genocide case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) referred 
repeatedly to the Krstić judgments (both of the Trial and the Appeals Chamber), 
particularly regarding the definition of the protected group within a geographically 
limited area89 and the massacres at Srebrenica.90 Without specifically mentioning 
forensic science exhumations, the ICJ referred to the Krstić case and its conclusion that 
‘the actus reus of killings in Article II(a) of the Convention was satisfied’.91 In relation to 
intent, the ICJ quoted the Trial Chamber’s findings that many non-combatant Bosnian 
Muslim men of military age had been targeted, the executions had happened on a large 
scale and the killing methods had been invariable, thus referring to evidence generated 
through forensic science and presented during Krstić.92
                                                 
89 See Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), International Court of Justice, 26 
February 2007, § 197.  
90 Ibid., §§ 278, 281, 290 and 292. 
91 Ibid., § 290. 
92 Ibid., § 292. 
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 With the Krstić ruling that genocide had indeed taken place, and in accepting 
forensic evidence as truthful, a judicial record was created that has since had 
ramifications for other trials and been accepted by many as an account of reality. 
International law expert Martti Koskienniemi notes that in war crimes trials, such as 
Krstić, the emphasis is on judging the individual and interpreting the historical and 
political context. International criminal trials are thus seen ‘to be conducting a political 
trial to the extent that what those facts are, and how they should be understood, is part of 
the conflict that is being adjudged.’93 Such politically connotative ‘procedural truth’, as 
indeed any form of truth according to post-modern thinker Foucault, has its limitations: 
Truth is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it 
induces regular effects of power. Each society has its régime of truth, its 
‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts 
and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable 
one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is 
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the 
acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what 
counts as true.94
 
Simply because trials aim to produce an impartial, authoritative account about past events 
does not mean they will be successful in this quest, nor does it mean that this new record 
will not be distorted for various political or personal reasons. A study into the perception 
of justice, accountability and social reconstruction amongst Bosnian judges and 
prosecutors, suggested that ‘a historical record with a legal imprint’95 in the manner of 
the ICTY is not always acceptable to them. The study’s finding states that  
                                                 
93 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’, in J.A. Frowein and R. Wolfrum (eds), Max 
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (Leiden: Martinus Njihoof Publishers, 2002) 1-36, at 33. 
94 M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge - Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon 
(New York: Prentice Hall, 1980), 131. 
95 Naqvi, supra note 80, at 246. 
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[a]though international trials render verdicts based on an examination of 
“facts,” the responses of our participants indicate that their perception of 
truth may outweigh the facts as determined by an international body.96
 
Evidence generated through forensic science increases the independence and impartiality 
of these facts: Although the judicial interpretation of facts can be highly disputed, the 
information from forensic examinations speaks, to some degree, for itself. Despite the 
constructed nature of ‘forensic truth’, it is invaluable to international criminal justice 
because it produces a truth of its own. Whilst some may query whether genocide 
happened,97 forensic exhumations and the physical evidence they produced from the 
graves make it very difficult to deny that hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men were 
executed.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Shedding light on the premises and parameters within which forensic experts operate is 
not intended to criticize their profession and scientific procedures. Science as a means of 
discovery is a very powerful (if not the most powerful) tool human kind has to explore 
and reveal truths about the world we live in.98 Nor does this article aim to solve the 
epistemological difficulties about how to adjudicate, but rather to give an overview of the 
main issues involved during the ‘forensic expertise meets international law’ interface; 
                                                 
96 The Human Rights Center and the International Human Rights Law Clinic, University of California, 
Berkeley, and the Centre for Human Rights, University of Sarajevo, ‘Justice, Accountability and Social 
Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors’, 18 Berkeley Journal of 
International Law (2000) 102-164, at 151.  
97 When questioned whether genocide had happened anywhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, all Bosniak 
legal professionals agreed that genocide against Bosniaks had occurred, while Bosnian Serb respondents’ 
answer were more mixed: some acknowledged that genocide had happened against all sides, others said 
they had no knowledge of crimes qualifying as genocide or that genocide had not happened. Bosnian Croat 
legal professionals, again, acknowledged that genocide had happened but that all three sides had been 
subjected to it (Ibid. 147-148). 
98 P. Atkins, ‘Science as Truth’, 8 History of the Human Sciences (1995) 97-102. 
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this in turn will help develop a theoretical framework to optimise activities, and minimise 
deficiencies, of forensic investigations. 
During atrocity crime investigations, forensic expertise successfully provides 
evidence within a legal context and its own socially constructed reality. It is from the 
outset inherently limited in its construction through its link with the prosecution and its 
limits as an applied science, yet it yields vital expert information for use in court where it 
is employed to bolster legal narratives. Indeed, the article outlines means to counter-
balance the limitations through the adoption of professional standards and operating 
procedures, the use of established scientific techniques and rigorous peer review. The 
resulting ‘forensic truth’ has to withstand cross-examination before judges decide on its 
credibility and reliability. To help prove that genocide actually occurred – whether 
intended or facilitated by Krstić – forensic evidence and other corroborating material 
were sufficient to convince both the Trial and the Appeals Chamber. Further to the 
conceptual exploration of the issues described here, it remains to be analysed how ethical 
and professional standards affect the creation of forensic evidence during the 
investigation and in court and what would happen if forensic science and legal operations 
produced incompatible accounts of the same event.99
 In light of the constructed nature of ‘forensic truth’, no matter how hard the 
experts strive for objectivity and independence, it becomes difficult to keep the 
positivistic ideal of searching for ‘the truth’ alive. Legal scholars and forensic experts 
alike may indeed favour the constructivist perspective of truth as a social construct.100 
Replacing the quest for ‘the truth’ with the more modest aim to establish ‘a truth’, may be 
                                                 
99 See D. Nelken, ‘A Just Measure of Science’, in M. Freeman and H. Reece (eds) Science in Court, Issues 
in Law and Society (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998) 11-36, at 13. 
100 Browne et al. supra note 4, at 73. 
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more appropriate, especially since all legal systems, including the ICTY, are also socially 
constructed and rely on political will, despite some legal scholars and human rights 
activists arguing that justice is universal and above politics:  
… such positivist notions fail to recognize that courts, like all institutions, 
exist because of, not in spite of politics. People and entire communities 
can interpret a tribunal's decisions, procedures (modes and manner of 
investigations, selection of cases, timing of trials, types and severity of 
punishments), and even its very existence in a variety of ways. Indeed, 
politics in this sense is imbedded in everything, especially the pursuit of 
justice.101
 
International criminal tribunals contribute to satisfying a plethora of needs of populations 
emerging from conflict. Through its use of forensic evidence and the verdicts it 
pronounces, the ICTY contributes to establishing a record of the past, acknowledging the 
victims and preventing impunity, historical revisionism and denial. To expect more from 
‘forensic truth’ and the tribunal’s ‘procedural truth’ would be ‘wishful thinking’.102
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